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CIVIL LIABILITY BY CRIMINAL LEGISLATION

CIVIL LIABILITY CREATED BY CRIMINAL
LEGISLATION
By CHARLEs L. B. Low NDES*

P

pride, coupled with an instinctive antagonism
toward legislation, leads the common law lawver to visualize
a tort as the special creation of the common law. But a tort may
originate in an act of the legislature or subordinate legislative
body.' If the statute or ordinance is explicit about civil liability,
there is no great difficulty apart from the ever-present problem in
its application to a border-line case.- But a perplexing situation is
created by those enactments which. while expressly providing only
for a criminal action, are found to entail certain civil consequences
as well. Specifically, there is great confusion in connection with
penal statutes or ordinances whose violation is held to create a civil
liability directly, or to do so indirectly on the subtler theory that
their violation is negligence per se or evidence of negligence.'
There are two problems which are not always clearly ditinguished: the statute must be construed; and the construed statute
must be fitted into the framework of the common law.
Construction involves an intelligent and discriminating jit'
ment upon the specific facts and circumstances of the indixidual
ROFESSIO-NAL

*Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Schuol, \\ a-h.:.
D. C.
'Familiar examples are statutes providing for workmen's cnitenation. abolishing the fellow ser-ant rule, recognizing a right of privar.
creating various business torts, and imposing extraordinary liabilities upol)
the owners of automobiles.
-An interesting illustration of the difficulty inherent in applying a
statute to a close case is Katz v. Wolff & Reinheimer. Inc.. (1927) 129 Misc.
Rep. 384. 221 X. Y. S. 476. A New York statute pro'ided that the owner
of an automobile should be liable for negligent injuries resuhing frcim thie
operation of his car, ifit was driven with hik "conent." The driver isf
one of the defendant's taxicabs became ill and without the defendIant's
knowledge procured X to drive the cab for him. X negligently ran into
the plaintiff. The court held that X's drivina the cah wa- nat unatlthfrized.
and that the owner of the cab was. therefore, liable under the qatute.
"See Thayer. Public Wrong and Private Action. (1914) 27 liarv. L..
Rex. 317. Selected Essays on the Law of Torts 276: Davis. The Plaintiff's
Illegal Action as a Defense. (1905) 18 Harv. L Rev. 505: Schneider.
Negligence hr Violation of Law. (1931) 11 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 217:
Notes and Comments: (1918) 18 Col. L. Rev. 603: (1928) 28 Col. L
Rev. 984: (1902) 15 Harv. L Rev. 225: (1915) 28 Harv. I- Rev. II"
(1928) 41 Hare. L. Rev. 541: (1928) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 116: (1924) 72
U. Pa. L Rev 187: (1928) 6 Tex. L. Rev. 398: (1918) 5 Va. L Rev. 145:
(1928) 14 Va. L. Rev. 582.
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case. It is poorly adapted to convenient rules of thumb. There
are, however, certain more or less clearly defined canons of judicial
good manners which may determine the court's approach to the
problem and thus mediately condition its conclusions.
Bear in mind that the legal meaning of a statute is not what
the legislature intended, nor even what the legislature said. Nor
is it what the statute would mean to a lawyer or layman of average intelligence and perception. It is what a competent court
says that the statute means. For example, a statute provided for
a tax upon the transfer of the net estate of every decedent dying
after the passage of the act "to the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, or with
respect to which he has created a trust in contemplation of or
intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his
death." The legislature or the reader of average perception might
suppose that "at any time" means at any time. They would be
sadly in error. "At any time" means at any time after the passage
of the taxing act. True, nothing in the statute itself indicates such
meaning. But this is what the Supreme Court of the United
States said that it meant.4 Individual interpretation may be a
congenial doctrine in theology, but it has no standing before the
law. What a statute means is determined by an official interpreter,-by a competent court speaking ex cathedra.
A court may construe a statute which expressly provides only
for a criminal liability to create a civil obligation as well. It
may find that the statute creates a crime expressly and a tort by
implication. In a good many cases courts have given this meaning
to criminal enactments. It is, perhaps, more conventional to say
that courts have found this meaning in the statute, but the exact
character of the judicial process by which this is achieved is expressed less fictitiously by given than found.
By confining our definition of legislative power to the enactments of a legislature, it is quite possible to reach the conclusion
that courts have no legislative power. But, if we accept as our
definition the power to make new law or to change existing law,
this is a power which the courts share with the popular assembly.
An absolute system of checks and balances, or a complete separation of powers, which such a system presupposes, is easier to conceive in theory than to apply in practice; and. probably, if we are
intellectually candid it is impossible to conceive such a system even
4

Schwab v. Doyle, (1922) 258 U. S. 529, 42 Sup. Ct. 391. 66 L. Ed. 747.
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ir. theory. A perfect system of checks and balances would be
tantamount to total governmental paralysis. Somewhere there must
be the power of making a final decision-somewhere there must
be a residuum of arbitrary authority capable of settling a given
question. Under our constitutional system, not as a written code,
but as an institutional growth, the arbitrary power of making laws
is vested in the courts. The courts have the uncontrolled power
of revoking the acts of the legislature and of creating new laws
by their mere fiat. Theoretically the power to legislate is in the
legislature. The power to adjudicate resides in the courts. But
since the power to adjudicate includes the power to legislate, and
in their adjudications the courts are answerable to no other department of the government,- they have the final and arbitrary power
of legislation.
Of course, there is a distinction between what courts do and
what courts can do. Most of us could poison our families, but
only a few unconventional souls go this far. This is not because
we lack the power, however, but because we are restrained by certain conscientious and affectionate scruples, plus, perhaps, an acute
consciousness of the consequences which might attend such an
endeavor. While the courts have the ability to legislate, they are
for the most part continent in exercising this power.
There is an admirable reason for such self restraint. Courts
like the legislature represent the community from which they derive their existence. As representatives they are bound to conform to its desires. By providing constitutionally for a separation
of powers, the communitv may have attempted the imlpo.silble.
but, at least, it has evinced a strong desire that laws .should be
made by the legislature and construed by the courts. It may be
admittedly impossible to make any precise demarcation in practice, but this does not excuse an attempt to conform to such a
distinction as far as it is possible to do so. It is difficult to see
how a court is justified in creating a new law in a case which can
be justly determined without the exercise of this power. When a
statute explicitly creates a criminal liability, the court which reads
a civil obligation into the enactment is embarking upon a perilous
speculation. This does not exceed its power, but it does overstep
the decent amenities of judicial conduct.
The court which holds that a criminal statute creates a civil
liability does not. of course, come out flatly and say that the legis5
A judge may be impeached by the legislature for misconduct in office.
but this does not invalidate his decisions.
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lature has been silent upon the subject and therefore it will decide
the matter as it sees fit. This may be what the court does, but it
is not what it says. Verbally, the court justifies its action by
"finding" that the legislature intended to create a civil duty although it did not explicitly state this intention. Such an intention
is usually imputed to the legislature where the court decides that
the statute was passed for the protection of a class of which the
plaintiff is a member.G The obvious difficulty with this theory,
however, is that even conceding a legislative intention to protect
this class it has not evidenced any intention of achieving this protection by the imposition of a civil liability, since the only remedy
provided by the statute is a criminal or penal proceeding. A right
is simply the ex post facto aspect of a remedy, and it savors of
absurdity to impute to the legislature an intention to create a
civil liability, where it has manifested no intention of creating a
civil remedy."
A pious cant which adds little to clear thinking about the law
of torts is the trite jingle that the law will suffer no wrong without
a remedy. If this means that the law will suffer no moral wrong
without giving a remedy, it is obviously untrue. If it means that
the law will suffer no legal wrong without a remedy this is mere
eThus, in Kelly v. Henry Muhs Co., (1904) 71 N. 1. L. 358. 59 Atl. 23.
a statute which was part of a general act entitled "A General Act Relating
to Factories and Workshops, and the Employment, Safety, Health and
Work Hours of Operatives" provided that elevator shafts should not I e
left unguarded. The defendant neglected to provide proper guards for
an elevator shaft on his premises. A fire broke out, and the plaintiff, a
fireman who was engaged in putting it out, fell down the shaft and was
injured. The court held that the purpose of the statute was to protect
employees and that since the plaintiff was not a member of this class, the
statute created no liability in his favor. On the other hand, in Parker v.
Barnard. (1883) 135 Mass. 116 there was a statute requiring elevators to
be guarded whose purpose was stated to be "to provide for the better preservation of life and property in Boston." The plaintiff, a policeman. in the
lawful discharge of his duties came upon the defendant's premises and fell
down an unguarded shaft. The court held that the statute created a right
of action in his favor. The purpose of the legislature was to protect persons lawfully upon the premises and the plaintiff was such a person.
1n Parker v. Barnard, (1883) 135 'Mass. 116. the court said. however.
"As a general rule, where an act is enjoined or forbidden under a statutory
penalty, and the failure to do the act enjoined or the doing of the act
forbidden has contributed to the injury, the party thus in default is liable
therefor to the party injured, notwithstanding he may also be subject to a
penalty." This is an extreme statement in an early case which would
scarcely be accredited today. It is an interesting illustration, however, of
the easy facility with which some courts miss the question of whether the
legislature has intended to create a civil liability. In substance the court
says that the statute creates a criminal liability and. therefore, it creates
a civil liability, as well. The court fails, however, to explain the "therefore." which is the crux of the whole problem.
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tautology, since the existence of a legal wrong presupposes a legal
remedy. In these cases the court is verbally carrying out the repressed desires of the legislature, but actually giving vent to its
own inhibitions. Under the pretense of construing the act of the
legislature, the court is writing the statute which it thinks the
legislature should have enacted.
But even though a court refuses to construe a statute to
create a civil liability, this does not preclude the possibility of the
statute having an important bearing upon the liability of a defendant in a civil suit. The court may reach this result in a perfectly
legitimate fashion by holding that the violation of the statute is an
element of a tort resting upon negligence. The difference between
these approaches in a given case may be one of technique rather
than result, but there is a good deal to be said in favor of using the
proper means to reach a given end.'
Here we are faced with the common law creation of negligence.
The liability of the defendant is based on common law principclt.

and the statute has only an indirect bearing. The prop,,sition is
that the defendant is liable for his negligent torts. and the violation
of the statute becomes an element of negligence.
Unfortunately the courts which favor this technique divide on
Compare the reasoning in these cases: In E-vers %. l)avi,. (19141 M
N. J. L. 196. 90 Atil. 677. the court said:
"'The reason why no civil action can be has-ed upon the satt- is l.-cause no such action or right of action is given by the s.talute. The l.1uttgiat-e
of the statute is entirely free from ambiguity; it ,veks to eliminate a ,,uritc
of danger by the imposition of a lienalty. The legislature could ii uch %iere
its intention have provided also that an one injured by a breach of the ,tttie
should have a renedy by civil action. It has nt een fit to d.) o anid the
court has no right to supply such omis.ion..
-lit, iluc-tini th, n i.
what is. upon common law principles. the effect if statute, -uch :l- thone which we are now considerint uponith.-' ;ictin oi nt :.h-,t ncc?In Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic L-aundry Co.. 119231 2 K. K:. 932.
Atkin. I- J. said:
"I imagine that the rule is this. that where a statute im.-,-cs a diiv
upon an individual the question whether a fluty i- ,,\\ed I,, a l-r-,o .iI.
grieved by a breach of the statute depends ,it the intention ,if it.li
:t,
to whether it is intended that a duty shall le o d 1,, the illvitillui1 .- %,11
as the state, or that the duty shall be owed ti the stat. "nh. Thal %Iit
Il
depend on the construction of the statute a, a whole, anti thu cirruni-t:ito .
in which it is made. and one of the circumstance; to lie t.ikt-lu
t, u-,,n.
sideration is this: Does the statute on the face of it contain a rvi'eroiceto the remedy for the breach of its provkions? If it d,,t-. Ih, i- iria
facie the only remedy. That. however. i; not conclusive: uwe mt-I till
look at the intention of the Legislature to be ascertained friu, lhe- 1,,riI
used and one may come to the conclusion that. althouah the -tantu
ct-:s,,
a duty and imposes a penalty for the hrearh of that duty. the ctatute : i,
still intend that a duty shall be owed to the pcrson amrieved.'
To fild
from the "word- used" an intention to create a cihil liabilitv. when 11-e
statute ex hy-pothesi says nothing abeut a civil liability would seem its be
quite a feat.
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the question of whether the violation of a criminal statute is negligence per se," or conclusive of negligence, or merely evidence of
negligence.10 At the outset, then, we are confronted with the
question of which view is correct, or whether either view is correct, that is, whether the violation of a criminal statute has any
bearing at all upon negligence.
Holding that the violation of a criminal statute is negligence
per se does not differ substantially from holding that the violation
of a criminal statute creates a direct civil liability. True, in this
case the court talks negligence rather than construction, and on
the former theory may admit certain defenses which would be
ftreign to the latter;" but in both cases the court is creating a
direct civil liability based solely upon the violation of the statute.
Negligence is essentially a negative concept. It is the absence
of due care, which is defined judicially as the amount of care
which a reasonably prudent man would have exercised under cir91,ott v. Pratt, (1885) 33 Minn. 323, 23 N. NV. 257; Osborne v. McMa~ters. (1889) 40 Minn. 103, 41 N. XV. 543; Martin v. Hcrzog, (1920)
228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814.
",Hanlon v. South Boston Horse Railroad, (1880) 129 Mass. 310;
Falk v. Finkelman, (1929) 268 Mass. 524, 168 N. E. 89.
In some jurisdictions, which normally hold that the violation of a
criminal enactment is negligence per se, an exception is made in the case
of speed laws or legislatively enacted rules of the road, whose violation is
held to be merely evidence of negligence. McWright v. Providence Tel.
Co., (1925) 47 R. 1. 196, 1.1 Atil. 841; Stevens v. Luther, (1920) 105 NOb.
184, 180 N. W. 87.
A famous anomaly is the 'Massachusetts doctrine that an unregistered
car is a -trespasser upon the highway,"-a holding which virtually amounts
to declaring that driving an unregistered car is negligence per se. in spite
of the fact that the .Massachusetts courts usually take the view that the
violation of a penal statute is simply evidence of negligence. See Schneider,
Negligence by Violation of Law. (1931)
11 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 217.
221-223. For a discussion of this problem from the point of view of
causation, see Armstead v. Lounsberry, (1915) 129 Minn. 34. 151 N. V.
542: Speight v. Simonsen. (1925) 115 Or. 618. 239 Pac. 542: Gilman v.
Central Vt. Ry., (1920) 93 Vt. 340. 107 Atl. 122: Chase v. N. Y. Central
Rv.. (1911) 208 Mass. 137. 94 N. E. 377. City of La Junta v. Dudley,
(1927) 82 Colo. 354. 260 Pac. 96 is an interesting decision which holds
that a city owes no duty of due care to protect persons driving unregistered
cars from injuries due to the dangerous condition of the city streets. In
this case the court said that whether the violation of the registration requirements was contributory negligence was not in issue since the car was
a trespasser upon the streets to which no duty of due care is owed.
In some states a distinction is made between a statute and an ordinance.
It is held that the violation of a statute is negligence per se. while the
hreach of an ordinance is simply evidence of negligence. See (1928) 14
Va. L. Rev. 591 (Note).
"lIf the action is allowed on the theory that the violation of the
statute is negligence per se. the defense of contributory negligence could
be urged where such a defense would be immaterial if the defendant's liability were based directly uoon the violation of the statute. See Evers v.
Davis. (1914) 86 N. J. L 196. 90 Atl. 677.
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cumstances similar to those which confronted the defendant at
the time of the injury. 12

Ezra Ripley Thayer argued that the

violation of a criminal statute is necessarily negligence because
the reasonably prudent man, that ideally legal man, could not
violate the law without fatal self-contradiction." It would seem,
however, that Thayer erred in vizualizing the reasonably prudent
man as a creature whose nature is determined by a court rather
than a jury.
It is not uncommon in discussing negligence to say that the
court instructs the jury as to what constitutes negligence and the
iury determines whether in the particular case the defendant has
been negligent. This is, however, a very hazy approximation of
the respective functions of court and jury. What more nearly
happens is that the court tells the jury that there is a social standard of conduct for unintentional injuries and the jury decides the
standard for the case confronting it and the defendant's conformitv or lack of conformity thereto.
Consider this more concretely. The issue is whether a given
defendant has been negligent in a given case. The court instructs
the jury that the defendant has been negligent unless he has exercised the care which a reasonably prudent man would have
exercised under similar circumstances. \What does the jury do?
Theoretically, it measures the defendant's conduct by the yardstick of the reasonably prudent man. Practically, however, this
is an impossible feat. There is no more a reasonably prudent man
than there is an average man in a world composed solely of individuals. It is manifestly impossible to test the defendant's
conduct by the measure of the actions of an individual who does
not exist. All that the jury can do. and all that the jury does do,
is to decide whether the defendant has or has not conducted himself as the jurors feel that society has the right to require that
he should conduct himself. Theoretically. this standard is objective. Actually, it amounts to the subjective judgment of the
jurors as to whether under all the facts and circumstances of the
case it is proper to "soak" the defendant or to let the plaintiff bear
1On the general topic of negligence see a collection of articles in
Wilson. Cases on Torts 291. Upon the question of the duty which the dcfendant must owe the plaintiff to refrain from negligent iniury see Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., (1928) 248 N. Y. 339. 162 N. E. 99 and Heaven
v. Pender, (1883) L. R. 11 Q. B. D. 503.
"3Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action. (1914) 27 Harv. L Rev.
317. Thayer drew a curious distinction between prohibitory and affirmative
statutes. The violation of a statutes which prohibits an act was negligence
per se.
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the loss which has occurred. This is no indictment of the jury.
At one time society let people adjust their differences by trial by
battle. If at the present time society prefers to have these cases
settled by the untutored social judgment of twelve travelling salesmen, or bricklayers, or plumbers, or shopkeepers, or other individuals who lack the intelligence to be disqualified as jurors or the
influence to escape this unwelcome task, it is beyond the province
of this article to comment upon the fact. But, before we put too
much stock in the reasonably prudent man, it is well to see just
who this fellow is.
The fallacy in Thayer's argument lies in the fatal assumption
that the social standard of conduct in negligence, or the nature of
the reasonably prudent man, is defined by the court rather than
the jury. Underlying Thayer's whole article is the tacit premise
that the court defines what a reasonably prudent man would or
would not do, and the jury says that this is what the defendant has
or has not done. This is manifestly not so. The social standard
of conduct is determined by the jury as well as the defendant's
conformity or lack of cionformity to tlis standard. The court
does not instruct the jury that in a given case the reasonably pru-dent man would have done this or that; it simply tells the jury
that there is a reasonably prudent man, and it is left to the jurors
to say what he would do. In other words, the court does not instruct the jury about this standard at all. It tells the jury that
there is such a standard, and part of the accepted province of
the triers of the facts is to formulate the standard according to
their own notions of justice and policy.
It is amazing that as accurate and brilliant a thinker as Thayer
could in the same article take the stand that a court should not
construe a criminal statute to create a civil liability directly. and
then argue, without apparent sense of contradiction, that the violation of the statute constitutes negligence per se. It seems obvious that if the court really applies the common law principles
of negligence to the violation of the statute, as Thayer felt that it
should, there is no tenable basis for holding that the violation of
the statute constitutes negligence per se, unless we abandon the
settled premises about the respective functions of court and jury
in a negligence case. In spite of the fact that Thayer pointed out
that the reasonably prudent man is a patent fiction, he put rather
too much store by this conception. He felt that it followed as an
inevitable conclusion from the conception of the reasonably pru-
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dent man that the violation of a criminal statute was necessarily
negligent. True, the doctrine of the reasonably prudent man is a
legal doctrine, but the qualities of this superb individual are not
determined by legal rules, but by the social judgment of the
jurors. It is beside the point to argue what a reasonably prudent
man would or would not do. The actions of the reasonably prudent man cannot predetermine the judgment of the jury. The
judgment of the jury determines the actions of the reasonably
prudent man. The formulation of the social standard of conduct
for unintentional injuries is for the jury, not for the court, and,
consequently, it would appear to follow that the jury must determine whether the violation of a criminal statute is or is not
negligence.
If a court holds that the violation of a criminal enactment is
negligence per se, it is simply taking the roundabout route to the
conclusion that the violation of the statute creates a civil liability.
This is, perhaps, less arrogant than reaching the same result by
construction, but it is also a shade less honest. If the violation of
a criminal statute has any bearing on negligence. itis, at most.
simply evidence of negligence. The question remains, however.
whether it can be fairly said to be even evidence of negligence.
This again depends on what is meant by negligence. I f the
basic idea behind this doctrine is careless conduct, it may well le
questioned whether the violation of a criminal statute has any
legitimate bearing upon the question of negligence. Carelessness
may be criminal, but does it follow that criminality iscareless?
There are several plausible reasons for saying that the violation of a criminal statute is evidence of negligence. It seems
arguable that the failure to conform to a statutory course of conduct is careless. If this is arguable. then, it is a fair matter to
submit to the judgment of the jurors. Unless the jury are exceptionally discriminating, however, it is very doubtful whether
the carelessness of the defendant in failing to conform to the
statute will impress them as much as the illegality of his actions
As a matter of fact, the jury will be more apt to decide against
the defendant because he has violated the law than because of an%
absence of due care. However. it is not entirely apparent that
thii is objectionable. The basic idea at the root of negligence is
that a defendant should be held for the unintentional consequences
of socially undesirable conduct, or conduct which appears to the
jury to be socially undesirable. May it not be said that in deter-
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mining what is socially undesirable the jury should take into consideration the illegality of the defendant's actions?
Observe, however, that the law does not hold that all careless
conduct is negligent. Negligence does not mean that a man must
exercise the highest possible degree of care but only due care or
reasonable care. By a parity of reasoning, it seems to follow that
all illegal conduct is not negligent but only that illegal conduct
which the jury feels is so socially undesirable that it should be
penalized by a civil as well as a criminal liability.
In this connection an interesting problem arises which is sometimes erroneously treated as a question of causation. Suppose
that an ordinance provides that an automobile shall not be parked
at a certain corner for longer than a specified period. The defendant leaves his car parked overtime. After die legal parking limit
has expired, a fire engirie strikes the car. and forces it up onto the
sidewalk. The car strikes the plaintiff and injures him. Should
the violation of the ordinance have any bearing upon the liability
of the defendant?
In this case the court held that the violation of the parking ordinance had no bearing upon the defendant's liability because this
was a condition and not a cause of the accident. 4 It is not helpful to talk of conditions and causes in any case,'" and it is certainly not so here. In the first place. it is apparent that the violation of a statute can never be the cause of an accident or injury.
Suppose. for-example. a clear case where 'the breach of the statute
has an immediate bearing upon liability. A statute requires poisons
24 Falk v. Finkelman. (1929) 268 Mass. 524. 168 N. E. 89.
35 There may be a philosophical distinction between cause and condition.
and some courts have attempted to make such a legal differentiation. This
seems somewhat futile. If A leaves a pile of gasoline drenched raus
beside a railroad right of way, which catch fire from the sparks from B's
engine and destroy C's property. A's liability is clearer than B's. which is
at least doubtful. But the metaphysician would probably say that A had
created a condition and B has caused the injury. There are two reasons
why a differentiation between cause and condition are not helpful as a legal
doctrine. In the first place, it is exceedingly difficult to formulate a
satisfactory criterion by which to distinguish a cause from a condition in
a given case. Thus, for example, in Chase v. N. Y. Central Ry.. (1911)
208 Mass. 137, 94 N. E. 377. the court held that operating an unregistered
vehicle was the cause of an accident, while in Gilman v. Central Vt. Ry..
(1920) 93 Vt. 340. 107 Atl. 122. the failure to comply with a registration
statute was held to be merely a condition and not a cause of an injury. In
the second place, a philosophical condition furnishe- as valid a starting
point for legal liability as a philooohical cause. If this distinction has any
meaning in law. it is that a condition is a cause which has no legal significance, that is. a remote as distinguished from a proximate cause. It seems
simpler, however, to sveak of remote and proximate causes rather than to
add new confusion by introducing the element of conditions.
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to be labelled. The defendant in violation of this requirement sells
an unlabelled bottle of poison to the plaintiff's intestate, who drinks
the poison in ignorance of its character. 6 It is clear that the
failure to conform to the statute did not cause the injury. The
act which violated the statute caused the injury, not the breach
of the enactment itself. Speaking precisely and perhaps somewhat
pedantically, what caused the death was the sale of the unlabelled
bottle of poison to the plaintiff's intestate. The fact that this
was also a violation of a statute forbidding such sales did not affect the result. The plaintiff's intestate would have been just as
dead if there had been no statute.
It is evident that the violation of a statute has no causal connection with an injury in any case. What may cause the injury,
however, is the act or omission which constitutes the violation.
The violation of the statute goes not to causation but to culpability. That is, the breach of the statute does not contribute anything to the result, it merely colors the act or omission to act
which produces the result.
As a further illustration, suppose that there is a collision between the plaintiff who is driving a buggy and the defendant who
is driving an automobile. The plaintiff, at the time of the collision. was violating a statute which forbade driving after dark
without lights. The defendant was violating a statute which required him to keep to the right side of the road when rounding a
curve. Excluding the question of the defendant's liability, the
court held that if the plaintiff's failure to carry lights did not
cause the accident she would not be barred by contributory" negligence from. maintaining an action against the defendant. The
court explained this by saying that the failure to carry lights
would not be a cause of the injury if the road were so well lighted
that the defendant could have seen the plaintiff just as well
without lights as with them.", This is a clear case of causation.
However, the breach of the statute has no bearing upon any
causal relation. The significant factor is that the omission to
carry lights, which was the omission which violated the statute,
did not contribute to the injury, or, at least, might not have contributed to it. In these cases there may be a pure problem of causation, but the breach of the statute has no bearing upon this
problem. The important thing is whether the act or omission to
act which transgressed the statute produced the injury. If it did
26Osborne v. lMcMasters, (1889) 40 'Minn. 103. 41 N. W. 543.
2-Martin v. Herzog. (1920) 228 X. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814.
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not, then the violation of the statute has no bearing upon liability.
This is not because the violation of the statute lacks a causal connection with the injury. The violation of the statute never has
any causal bearing upon an injury. It is because the culpable act,
the act or omission which violated the statute, is not a cause of the
injury.
It is not particularly profitable to approach this problem from
the point of view of causation, for the evident reason that the
breach of a criminal statute does not bear upon causation at all,
but upon culpability. The only time when causation becomes a
factor is when it is manifest that the act or omission which violated the statute did not contribute to the injury. But there it is a
lack of any causal connection between the injury and the act. not
between the breach of the statute and the injury, which is important.
If the act or omission which violates a criminal statute lacks
any causal relation to the injury, it is plain that the breach of
the statute has no bearing upon liability. There is. however, a
class of cases where the act or omission has a causal connection
with the injury but the violation of the statute is nevertheless held
to be immaterial. Take, for example, the famous case of Gorris
v. Scott.'" A statute required vessels carrying cattle to provide
separate pens and footholds. The purpose of this enactment was
to prevent contagion among the animals. The defendant failed to
equip his ship with the pens and footholds required by the statute,
and in a storm the plaintiff's sheep were washed overboard. The
sheep would not have been lost if there had been the statutory
pens. The court held that the failure to comply with the statute
did not create any liability in favor of the plaintiff, since the
purpose of the statute was to protect the cattle from disease not
the hazards of the seas. Boronkay v. Robinson" illustrates the
same point. A statute required vehicles to park with their right
sides toward the curb. The defendant's truck was parked with
its left side toward the curb. A chain, with a hook attached to
the end of it, hung down from the left side of the truck, and when
it started up the hook caught a small boy standing on the curb
and fatally injured him. The court held that the violation of the
statute had no bearing upon liability.
It is apparent that you cannot explain these cases on principles
of causation. The omission to provide the pens caused the injury
18(1874) L. R. 9 Exch. 125.

19(1928) 247 N. Y. 365, 160 N. E. 400.
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in Gorris v. Scott, and parking the truck with the wrong side to
the curb caused the injury in Boronkay v. Robinson. It is true
that you might say that the act or omission, which violated the
statute, is a cause of the injury, but that it is not a proximate
cause, because the interest which was invaded was not one which
was protected by the statute; but this seems a roundabout statement for a proposition which can be stated more plainly without
any artificial reliance upon causation.
Starting from the initial premise that the violation of a
criminal statute creates a direct civil liability, or, what comes to
about the same thing, is negligence per se. there is a natural and
easy explanation for cases like Gorris v. Scott and Boronkay v.
Robinson. The effect of these decisions is that the violation of
the statute has no bearing on liability for an injury which it is not
the purpose of the statute to prevent. To determine what injuries
the statute is designed to prevent a scrutiny of the interests which
the statute seeks to protect is pertinent. An invasion of one or
more of those interests is an injury against which the statute seeks
tc provide. It is reasonably clear that, if the statute intended to
create a direct civil liability or conclusively to define negligence, it
must have intended to do this to some purpose. A manifest purpose is to protect the interests which the statute seeks to safeguard.
It would seem to follow that no liability is created unless such an
interest is invaded. This can be treated as a question of causation.
Nearly anything can for that matter. But the real problem seems
to be whether an interest protected by the statute has been invaded, rather than any causal relation2 ° This is a question of con2
OThere are of course cases involving the violation of a criminal enactment which really present a problem in causation. This was true of
Martin v. Herzog, (1920) 228 N. Y. 164. 126 N. E. 814. where the failure
of the plaintiff to carry lights would not have been a cause of the inur%if
the road was so well lighted that they would not have made the plaintiff's
vehicle more visible. Another case which illustrates this same point is
Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., (1927) 261 'Mass. 424. 158 N. 1-. 778. The
defendant left his car unlocked in violation of a statute. The car was
stolen, and the thief negligently ran into the plaintiff. The court held that
the violation of the statute had no bearing upon liability. because the
defendant could not be held to foresee the felonious taking of his car,
and therefore his act in leaving it unlocked was not a cause of the injury.
One may differ from the court's view as to the foreseeability of a felonious
act, but this was a clear question of causation.
On the other hand, it would appear that courts frequently try to
resolve questions of civil liability for the breach of a criminal enactment
by principles of causation where causation is really not in issue at all.
For example, there is a conflict as to whether the breach of a statute requiring an operator's license or registration is a proximate cause of an
injury which occurs due to the operation of a motor vehicle which is not
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struction, and it seems simpler to treat it as such without clouding
the issue by talking about legal cause. The real problem is
whether an interest safeguarded by the statute has been invaded.
If it has, the violation of the statute is relevant. If it has not,
the violation of the statute is immaterial as far as a direct liability under the statute is concerned. 2 It must be observed, however,
that this approach is only valid on the assumption that the legislature intended to protect these interests by a direct civil liability
or, its practical equivalent, by laying down a standard, deviation
from which constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence. The
interests which the legislature intended to protect, in other words,
must be interests which are protected civilly as well as criminally.
If the purpose of the statute is simply to protect these interests by
a criminal action, the purpose of the statute has no bearing upon
civil liability.
The result is that if one starts from what appears to be the
registered, or by an unlicensed operator. See the cases cited supra note 10.
The courts which hold that the violation of the statute is not a proximate
cause seem to be thinking of the violation of the statute itself rather than
the act which violated it. The courts which taLe .!*-ppositc
view think
of the act of operating the vehicle which indubitably caused the accident
and also violated the statute. The result is that it is impossible for these
courts to reach any agreement because they are thinking about different
things. It seems clear, however, that the violation of the statute cannot
be a cause of the injury, while the act which violates the statute certainly
is a cause. The solution for these cases then lies not in any doctrine of
causation but in an examination of the interests which it is the purpose
of the statute to protect. It is true that different courts might feel differently
about the interests which the legislature sought to safeguard by passing
the statute; that is, some courts might feel that they were designed to
safeguard the public interest in revenue, and other courts might take the
position that they were intended primarily for the protection of persons
using the highway. A proper approach to these problems would not
eliminate entirely conflict among the decisions, but it would at least present
a clear and intelligent breach.
Much the same thing is true of those decisions which hold that there
is no causal connection in an action for malpractice between the violation
of a statute requiring a physician to be licensed and the injury to the
patient. Brown v. Shyne. (1926) 242 N. Y. 176. 151 N. E. 197: Janssen v.
Mudder, (1925) 232 Mich. 183. 205 N. W. 159; and those decisions which
take an opposite stand. Whipple v. Grandchamp. (1927) 261 Mass. 40.
158 N. E. 270; Harris v. Graham, (1927) 124 Okla. 196. 255 Pac. 710:
or those cases holding that the violation of a Sunday law is not the
proximate cause of injuries suffered by Sunday travellers, Sutton v. Town
of Wawatosa, (1871) 29 Wis. 21; Baldwin v. Barney. (1879) 12 R. I.
392 and those courts which hold to the contrary. Smith v. Boston & M.
Ry., (1876) 120 Mass. 490; Cf. Johnson v. Irasburgh, (1874) 47 Vt. 28.
21
1t is immaterial as far as the creation of a direct statutory liability
or a liability based on regarding the breach of the statute as negligence per
se is concerned, although it will be argued later that it may have an
indirect bearing upon the defendant's common law liability as evidence of
negligence.
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more analytically correct position, that the violation of a criminal
statute is merely evidence of negligence, cases like Gorris v. Scott
and Boronkay v. Robinson present a more perplexing problem.
The underlying assumption here is that the statute does not create
any civil obligation or afford civil protection against the injuries
which it is designed to prevent, because the legislature has not
manifested any intention to create a civil remedy for such injuries.
The effect of the statute here is to show culpability-to color an
act or omission which caused the injury. The interest which is
invaded derives its protection from the common law, not from
an act of the legislature. It would seem that the defendant might
Le equally culpable, that is, his conduct might be just as antisocial, in a case where he has inflicted an injury which the statute
was not designed to prevent as where he has caused an injury
against which the legislature sought to provide.-'
It is difficult to see any satisfactory basis for limiting the effect
of the statute as mere evidence of negligence to a case where the
interest which is infringed is one which the statute was designed
to protect. If the liability of the defendant is predicated upon
the violation of the statute, then the interests protected by the
statute are important in delimiting the scope of statutory liability.
But, if the defendant is to be held on common law principles of
negligence, the violation of the statute is pertinent not as a
22
In Boronkay v. Robinson, (1928) 247 N. Y. 365, 160 N. E. 400 the
court seemed to feel that if the violation of a statute was not negligence

per se, it would not be even evidence of negligence. Cardozo, Ch. J. said:
"The death of the plaintiff's intestate may have been due to negligence

on the part of the defendant in failing to observe that the chain was in a
position where it might strike a person on the curb, but the rule as to the

manner in which vehicles must proceed and stop created

no safeguard

against such a danger and disobedience of that rule was not the cause of
the plaintiff's intestate's death. If that was due to any negligence on the
part of the defendant, it was negligence which had no connection with the
duty imposed by statute or ordinance."
The court seems obviously correct in holding that the violation of the
statute was not negligence per se, because the injury was not one which
the statute was designed to prevent. Its use of the word cause is unfortunate, since the act which violated the statute certainly caused the
injury. Conceding, however, that the purpose of the statute was not to
prevent this type of injury, and that its breach, therefore, affords no basis
for holding that the defendant was negligent per se, it is not equally
apparent that the violation of the statute should not be considered as an
element of culpability,--as evidence of negligence.
Compare, in this connection, the cases which have held that the
violation of a statute may be evidence of negligence although the plaintiff
is not one of the class for whose benefit the statute was designed. Hanson

v. Kemmish, (1926) 201 Iowa 1008, 208 N. W. 277; Dohm v. Cardozo,
(1925) 165 Minn. 193, 206 N. W. 377.
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definition of the interests protected, but as an element of culpability. It is difficult to see how the purpose for which the statute
was passed can affect the question of culpability.
In this connection, it is important to remember, however, that
if the act or omission which constitutes the breach of the statute
has no causal relation to the injury, the violation of the statute
should not even be evidence of negligence. The breach of the
statutory enactment simply shows that the act or omission was to
some extent culpable, but even a culpable act is not a starting
point for liability unless it is related to the injury.
CONCLUSION

The creation of civil liability by the breach of a criminal enactment is a perplexing problem. To say that the statute imposes
a direct civil liability is not beyond the power of the court, but
this type of construction has a tendency to usurp the function of
the legislature.
Perhaps, the weight of authority (if this is material) takes
the view that the violation of a criminal statute is conclusively
negligent. The difficulty with this approach is that it is only a
roundabout and disingenuous statement of the proposition that
the violation of the statute creates a civil liability. As soon as a
court says that anything is negligence per se, the question of negligence is eliminated. The defendant's liability is based upon the
failure to comply with an absolute rule of law rather than a social
standard of conduct created by the jury for that particular case.
It is true that a liability predicated upon an act which is negligence
per se may be more readily defeasible than a liability which is
based directly upon the violation of the statute, but the fact remains that the liability is created in both cases not by the failure
to measure up to any standard, but by the breach of a definite legal
rule.
The alternatives are that the violation of the criminal statute
has no bearing at all upon the civil liability of the defendant, or
that it is merely an element of culpability to be considered by the
jury in determining negligence. As an original question, the
proposition that the violation of a criminal statute has no bearing
on negligence is not entirely unappealing. However, while it is
clear that there is no intrinsic relation between criminal conduct
and careless conduct, the violation of any enactment is probably
sufficiently anti-social to warrant the consideration of a jury in
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formulating the social standard of conduct in a case involving an
unintentional injury.
Starting with the premise that the violation of a criminal
statute is simply evidence of negligence raises a difficult question
where the injury which occurs is one which the statute was not
designed to prevent. But, since the relevance of the statute in
this case is to color the defendant's act or omission, rather than
to define the interests which are to be protected by the action, it
seems a fair conclusion that even here the violation of the statute
may be considered by the jury as evidence pertinent to their decision as to the standard of conduct which society is entitled to
exact from the defendant and his compliance or failure to comply
with that standard.

